毛泽东选集/抗日游击战争的战略问题

#§In the War of Resistance Against Japan, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary.

# Thus, it seems there are only tactical problems in guerrilla warfare. # Why then raise the question of strategy?

#§If China were a small country in which the role of guerrilla warfare was only to render direct support over short distances to the campaigns of the regular army, there would, of course, be only tactical problems but no strategic ones.

# On the other hand, if China were a country as strong as the Soviet Union and the invading enemy could either be quickly expelled, or, even though his expulsion were to take some time, he could not occupy extensive areas, then again guerrilla warfare would simply play a supporting role in campaigns, and would naturally involve only tactical but not strategic problems.

#§The question of strategy in guerrilla war does arise, however, in the case of China, which is neither small nor like the Soviet Union, but which is both a large and a weak country.

# This large and weak country is being attacked by a small and strong country, but the large and weak country is in an era of progress; this is the source of the whole problem.

# It is in these circumstances that vast areas have come under enemy occupation and that the war has become a protracted one.

# The enemy is occupying vast areas of this large country of ours, but Japan is a small country, she does not have sufficient soldiers and has to leave many gaps in the occupied areas, so that our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consists primarily not in interior-line operations in support of the campaigns of the regular troops but in independent operations on exterior lines; furthermore, China is progressive, that is to say, she has a staunch army and broad masses of people, both led by the Communist Party, so that, far from being small-scale, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is in fact large-scale warfare. # Hence the emergence of a whole series of problems, such as the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, etc.

# The protracted nature of the war and its attendant ruthlessness have made it imperative for guerrilla warfare to undertake many unusual tasks; hence such problems as those of the base areas, the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, and so on.

# For all these reasons, China's guerrilla warfare against Japan has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy, and it demands examination from the viewpoint of strategy.

# The point that merits our particular attention is that such extensive as well as protracted guerrilla warfare is quite new in the entire history of war.

# This is bound up with the fact that we are now in the Nineteen Thirties and Nineteen Forties and that we now have the Communist Party and the Red Army. # Herein lies the heart of the matter.

# Our enemy is probably still cherishing fond dreams of emulating the Mongol conquest of the Sung Dynasty, the Manchu conquest of the Ming Dynasty, the British occupation of North America and India, the Latin occupation of Central and South America, etc.

# But such dreams have no practical value in present-day China because there are certain factors present in the China of today which were absent in those historical instances, and one of them is guerrilla warfare, which is quite a new phenomenon.

#§These are the reasons why our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, though occupying only a supplementary place in the War of Resistance as a whole, must nevertheless be examined from the viewpoint of strategy.

#§Why not, then, apply to guerrilla warfare the general strategic principles of the War of Resistance?

#§The question of strategy in our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is indeed closely linked with the question of strategy in the War of Resistance as a whole, because they have much in common.

# On the other hand, guerrilla warfare is different from regular warfare and has its own peculiarities, and consequently many peculiar elements are involved in the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare. # Without modification it is impossible to apply the strategic principles of the War of Resistance in general to guerrilla warfare with its own peculiarities.

#§CHAPTER II THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF WAR IS TO PRESERVE ONESELF AND DESTROY THE ENEMY

#§Before discussing the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare in concrete terms, a few words are needed on the fundamental problem of war.

#§All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of the one basic principle: to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy.

# For instance, the basic political principle of China's War of Resistance Against Japan, i. e. , its political aim, is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build an independent, free and happy new China.

# In terms of military action this principle means the use of armed force to defend our motherland and to drive out the Japanese invaders.

# To attain this end, the operations of the armed units take the form of doing their utmost to preserve their own strength on the one hand and destroy the enemies on the other.