§*这是毛泽东同志为中共中央起草的给西南局、西藏工委并告西北局、新疆分局的党内指示。
#§Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.# It was sent to the Southwest Bureau and the Working Committee in Tibet and communicated to the Northwest Bureau and the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau.
§我们基本上同意西南局、西南军区四月二日给西藏工委和西藏军区的指示电,认为这个电报所取的基本方针(除了改编藏军一点外)及许多具体步骤是正确的。
#§The Central Committee essentially approves the instructions which the Southwest Bureau and the Southwest Military Area cabled on April 2 to the Working Committee and Military Area in Tibet.# It holds that the basic policies (except the point about reorganizing the Tibetan troops) and the various specific steps set forth in the telegram are correct.
只有照此做去,才能使我军在西藏立于不败之地。
# Only by following them can our army establish itself in an invulnerable position in Tibet.
§西藏情况和新疆不同,无论在政治上经济上西藏均比新疆差得多。
#§Conditions in Tibet are different from those in Sinkiang.
Tibet compares poorly with Sinkiang, whether politically or economically.
我王震部入疆,尚且首先用全力注意精打细算,自力更生,生产自给。
# But even in Sinkiang, the first thing the army units under Wang Chen did when they got there was to pay the utmost attention to strict budgeting, self-reliance and production for their own needs.
现在他们已站稳脚跟,取得少数民族热烈拥护。
# They have now gained a firm foothold and won the warm support of the minority nationalities.
目前正进行减租减息,今冬进行土改,群众将更拥护我们。
# They are carrying out the reduction of rent and interest and will proceed to agrarian reform this winter, and by then we can be sure of even greater support from the masses.
新疆和关内汽车畅达,和苏联有密切经济联系,在物质福利上给了少数民族很大好处。
# Sinkiang is well connected with the heartland of the country by motor roads, and this is of great help in improving the material welfare of the minority nationalities.
西藏至少在两三年内不能实行减租,不能实行土改。
# As for Tibet, neither rent reduction nor agrarian reform can start for at least two or three years.
新疆有几十万汉人,西藏几乎全无汉人,我军是处在一个完全不同的民族区域。
# While several hundred thousand Han people live in Sinkiang, there are hardly any in Tibet, where our army finds itself in a totally different minority nationality area.
我们惟靠两条基本政策,争取群众,使自己立于不败。
# We depend solely on two basic policies to win over the masses and put ourselves in an invulnerable position.
第一条是精打细算,生产自给,并以此影响群众,这是最基本的环节。
# The first is strict budgeting coupled with production for the army's own needs, and thus the exertion of influence on the masses; this is the key link.
公路即使修通,也不能靠此大量运粮。
# Even when highways are built, we cannot count on moving large quantities of grain over them.
印度可能答应交换粮物入藏,但我们的立脚点,应放在将来有一天万一印度不给粮物我军也能活下去。
# India will probably agree to send grain and other goods to Tibet on the basis of exchange, but the stand we must take is that our army should be able to carry on even if India stops sending them some day.
我们要用一切努力和适当办法,争取达赖及其上层集团的大多数,孤立少数坏分子,达到不流血地在多年内逐步地改革西藏经济、政治的目的;但也要准备对付坏分子可能率领藏军举行叛变,向我袭击,在这种时候我军仍能在西藏活下去和坚持下去。
# We must do our best and take proper steps to win over the Dalai and the majority of his top echelon and to isolate the handful of bad elements in order to achieve a gradual, bloodless transformation of the Tibetan economic and political system over a number of years; on the other hand, we must be prepared for the eventuality of the bad elements leading the Tibetan troops in rebellion and attacking us, so that in this contingency our army could still carry on and hold out in Tibet.
凡此均须依靠精打细算,生产自给。
# It all depends on strict budgeting and production for the army's own needs.
以这一条最基本的政策为基础,才能达到目的。
# Only with this fundamental policy as the cornerstone of our work can we achieve our aim.
第二条可做和必须做的,是同印度和内地打通贸易关系,使西藏出入口趋于平衡,不因我军入藏而使藏民生活水平稍有下降,并争取使他们在生活上有所改善。
# The second policy, which can and must be put into effect, is to establish trade relations with India and with the heartland of our country and to attain a general balance in supplies to and from Tibet so that the standard of living of the Tibetan people will in no way fall because of our army's presence but will improve through our efforts.
只要我们对生产和贸易两个问题不能解决,我们就失去存在的物质基础,坏分子就每天握有资本去煽动落后群众和藏军反对我们,我们团结多数、孤立少数的政策就将软弱无力,无法实现。
# If we cannot solve the two problems of production and trade, we shall lose the material base for our presence, the bad elements will cash in and will not let a single day pass without inciting the backward elements among the people and the Tibetan troops to oppose us, and our policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few will become ineffectual and fail.
§西南局四月二日电报的全部意见中,只有一点值得考虑,这就是短期内改编藏军和成立军政委员会是否可能和得策的问题。
#§Of all the views set forth in the Southwest Bureau's telegram of April 2 there is only one that calls for further consideration, what I refer to is the feasibility and advisability of reorganizing the Tibetan troops and setting up a military and administrative commission fairly soon.
我们意见,目前不要改编藏军,也不要在形式上成立军分区,也不要成立军政委员会。
# It is our opinion that the Tibetan troops should not be reorganized at present, nor should formal military sub-areas or a military and administrative commission be established.
暂时一切仍旧,拖下去,以待一年或两年后我军确能生产自给并获得群众拥护的时候,再谈这些问题。
# For the time being, leave everything as it is, let this situation drag on, and do not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now.
在这一年至两年内可能发生两种情况:一种是我们团结多数、孤立少数的上层统战政策发生了效力,西藏群众也逐步靠拢我们,因而使坏分子及藏军不敢举行暴乱;一种是坏分子认为我们软弱可欺,率领藏军举行暴乱,我军在自卫斗争中举行反攻,给以打击。
# In the meantime there are two possibilities.# One is that our united front policy towards the upper stratum, a policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few, will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us, so the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel.# The other possibility is that the bad elements, thinking we are weak and can be bullied, may lead the Tibetan troops in rebellion and that our army will counter-attack in self-defence and deal them telling blows.
以上两种情况,无论哪一种都对我们有利。
# Either will be favourable for us.