(3) 另外，从一般条约法、 尤其是保留法 所固有的协商一致性可以推断，虽然各国可随意提出(而非作出 )保留，但其他国家也必须有权作出是接受还是反对保留的回应。
(3) Furthermore, it follows from the inherently consensual nature of the law of treaties in general, and the law of reservations in particular, that, although States are free to formulate (not to make) reservations, the other parties must be entitled to react by accepting the reservation or objecting to it.
如果保留案文令人无法把握其范围，情况就不是这样了。
That is not the case if the text of the reservation does not allow its scope to be assessed.
(4) 当一项保留援引了国内法，但该国在提出保留时却没有确定有关条款或指明该条款是否载于其宪章或民法或刑法中时，情况往往这样。
(4) This is often the case when a reservation invokes the internal law of the State which has formulated it without identifying the provisions in question or specifying whether they are to be found in its constitution or its civil or criminal code.
在这种情况下，援引保留国国内法本身并非问题， 问题在于援引国内法的保留常常较为含糊和笼统，这使得其他缔约国无法对其采取立场。
In these cases, the reference to the domestic law of the reserving State is not per se the problem, but the frequent vagueness and generality of the reservations referring to domestic law, which make it impossible for the other States parties to take a position on them.
“(d) 若保留以笼统且不确定的方式令条约之适用从属于国内法，则条约将无法执行。”
“(d) The reservation renders the treaty inoperative by making its application subject, in a general and indeterminate manner, to national law.”
(5) 芬兰就某些缔约国对1989年《儿童权利公约》的保留提出反对，其说理基础肯定要比援引1969年《维也纳公约》第27条更牢固； 比如，马来西亚表示接受1989年《公约》的若干规定，条件是“它们与宪法、国家法律和马来西亚政府的国家政策不抵触”， 芬兰认为，这种保留的“笼统性”令人怀疑“马来西亚对《公约》和履行《公约》义务的承诺程度”。
(5) Finland's objections to the reservations of several States parties to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child are certainly more solidly reasoned on that ground than by a reference to article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention; for instance, in response to the reservation by Malaysia, which had accepted a number of the provisions of the 1989 Convention “only if they are in conformity with the Constitution, national laws and national policies of the Government of Malaysia”, Finland considered that the “broad nature” of that reservation left open “to what extent Malaysia commits itself to the Convention and to the fulfilment of its obligations under the Convention”.
泰国的解释性发言，即“泰国不把本公约[1966年《消除一切形式种族歧视国际公约》]条款视作为泰王国设定了[其]宪法和[其]法律以外的任何义务，泰国也不会如此适用” 也引起了瑞典方面的反对。
Thailand's interpretative declaration to the effect that it “does not interpret and apply the provisions of this Convention [the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination] as imposing upon the Kingdom of Thailand any obligation beyond the confines of [its] Constitution and [its] laws” also prompted an objection on the part of Sweden that, in so doing, Thailand was making the application of the Convention subject to a general reservation which made reference to the limits of national legislation the content of which was not specified.
瑞典认为，泰国这样做使得《公约》的适用以一项笼统的保留为条件，该保留援引国家立法的限制，但却未能说明限制的内容。
Thailand's interpretative declaration to the effect that it “does not interpret and apply the provisions of this Convention [the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination] as imposing upon the Kingdom of Thailand any obligation beyond the confines of [its] Constitution and [its] laws” also prompted an objection on the part of Sweden that, in so doing, Thailand was making the application of the Convention subject to a general reservation which made reference to the limits of national legislation the content of which was not specified.
(6) 若一国保留其宪法效力优于条约的笼统权利，情况亦然； 比如，美利坚合众国对《防止及惩治灭绝种族罪公约》的保留。
(6) The same applies when a State reserves the general right to have its constitution prevail over a treaty, as for instance in the reservation by the United States of America to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
“《公约》的一切规定均不要求也不授权要求美利坚合众国采取依其所解释的美国宪法所禁止的立法或其他行动。”
“Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.”
(7) 一些所谓的“伊斯兰法保留” 引起了同样的反对，案例之一就是毛里塔尼亚在批准1979年《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》时提出的保留，该保留称，“批准《公约》中一切不违反伊斯兰法并符合我们宪法的条款”。
(7) Some of the so-called “sharia reservation” give rise to the same objection, a case in point being the reservation by which Mauritania approved the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women “in each and every one of its parts which are not contrary to Islamic sharia”.
这里，问题仍然不在于毛里塔尼亚援引了它适用的一项来源于宗教的法律这一事实， 而在于，正如丹麦指出的那样，“关于伊斯兰法规定的笼统保留的范围没有限制，性质也不明确。”
Here again, the problem lies not in the very fact that Mauritania is invoking a law of religious origin which it applies, but, rather that, as Denmark noted, “the general reservations with reference to the provisions of Islamic law are of unlimited scope and undefined character”.
因此，如联合王国所言，这种保留“包含了对国家法律的笼统引用，同时没有明确其内容，不能向《公约》的其他缔约国明确阐明保留国接受《公约》义务的程度。”
Thus, as the United Kingdom put it, such a reservation “which consists of a general reference to national law without specifying its contents does not clearly define for the other States Parties to the Convention the extent to which the reserving State has accepted the obligations of the Convention”.
(8) 基本上，是无法评估此类保留是否与条约的目的和宗旨相符合，而非确定它们肯定不相符合，才使这些保留属于《维也纳条约法公约》第19条(c)项的范畴。
(8) Basically, it is the impossibility of assessing the compatibility of such reservations with the object and purpose of the treaty, and not the certainty that they are incompatible, which makes them fall within the purview of article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
As the Human Rights Committee pointed out:
“保留必须具体且透明，以便委员会、保留国管辖之下的人以及其他缔约国能够清楚保留国承担和未承担哪些遵守人权的义务。
“Reservations must be specific and transparent, so that the Committee, those under the jurisdiction of the reserving State and other States parties may be clear as to what obligations of human rights compliance have or have not been undertaken.
因此，保留不得笼统，而必须针对《公约》的某项规定，并精确地说明其针对该规定的范围。”
Reservations may thus not be general, but must refer to a particular provision of the Covenant and indicate in precise terms its scope in relation thereto.”
(9) 根据《欧洲人权公约》第57条，“不容许一般性保留……”。
(9) According to article 57 of the European Convention on Human Rights, “[r]eservations of a general character shall not be permitted ”.
欧洲人权法院在贝利洛斯一案中宣布，瑞士对《欧洲人权公约》第6条第1款的解释性声明(相当于保留)是无效的，原因是该声明“措辞过于含糊或笼统，以至于令人无法确定其确切含义和范围。”
The European Court of Human Rights, in the Belilos case, declared invalid the interpretative declaration (equivalent to a reservation) by Switzerland on article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention because it was “couched in terms that are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact meaning and scope”.
但是，毫无疑问的是，正是欧洲人权委员会最明确地提出了这里所适用的原则，即它在判决中所称，“若一项保留的措辞令人无法确定其范围，……则该保留属于笼统性的保留。”
But it is unquestionably the European Commission on Human Rights that most clearly formulated the principle applicable here when it judged that “a reservation is of a general nature when it is worded in such a way that it does not allow its scope to be determined”.
(10) 准则草案3.1.7体现了这种基本概念。
(10) Draft guideline 3.1.7 reflects this fundamental notion.
它的标题表明了一项保留需要在其范围内展示的(可供选择的)特性：它适用于“含糊”或“概括”的保留。
Its title gives an indication of the (alternative) characteristics which a reservation needs to exhibit to come within its scope: it applies to reservations which are either “vague” or “general”.
前者可能是在它可能适用的情况中或者保留方有效承担的义务中留下一些不确定性的保留 。
The former might be a reservation which leaves some uncertainty as to the circumstances in which it might be applicable or to the extent of the obligations effectively entered into by its author.
后者同上列事例互相对应。
The latter corresponds to the examples enumerated above.
(11) 虽然本评注可能不是讨论含糊或笼统保留的效果的适当处所，却必须指出，它们引起了特定的问题。
(11) Although the present commentary may not be the right place for a discussion of the effects of vague or general reservations, it must still be noted that they raise particular problems.