鉴于我们以往在新区所犯的急性病的错误，脱离了群众，孤立了自己，在对敌斗争与确立根据地的事业上，造成了许多困难，所以全区都应根据五月二十五日中央关于一九四八年的土地改革工作和整党工作的指示，重新地全盘考虑我们的工作方针和策略步骤。
We were guilty of being too impetuous in the new liberated areas, alienating ourselves from the masses, isolating ourselves, and creating many difficulties in our struggle against the enemy and in our effort to establish base areas.
In view of this, comrades working in the Central Plains should review all our policies and tactical measures in accordance with the directive on the work of land reform and of Party consolidation in 1948, issued by the Central Committee on May 25.
中原全区四千五百万人口，我们业已基本上控制的区域约二千万人口，游击区约一千万人口，还没有到过我们部队的崭新区约一千五百万人口。
The Central Plains has a total population of 45 million, with about 20 million in areas basically under our control, 10 million in guerrilla zones and about 15 million in areas soon to be liberated by our army.
而在控制区和游击区的三千万人口中，实行了分田的不超过四百万人口，其余的地方大都只分了浮财。
For the 30 million in the areas under our control and the guerrilla zones, land has been redistributed among four million at most; only movable property has been redistributed among the rest.
因此，在极大部分的区域，包括没有真正分配土地的控制区及一切游击区和崭新区，都应根据中央指示，“充分利用抗日时期的经验，实行减租减息和酌量调剂种子食粮的社会政策和合理负担的财政政策，以便联合或中立一切可能联合或中立的社会力量，帮助人民解放军消灭一切国民党武装力量和打击政治上最反动的恶霸分子。
Therefore, in the great majority of the areas, including those areas under our control where land has not really been redistributed and all the guerrilla zones and the areas unreached by our army, we should follow the Central Committee's directive to “make full use of the experience acquired during the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and put into effect the social policy of reducing rent and interest and of properly adjusting supplies of seed and food grains”.
We should also apply “the financial policy of the reasonable distribution of burden, so as to unite with all social forces or persuade them to take a neutral stand, and help the People's Liberation Army to wipe out all the Kuomintang armed forces and strike blows at the local tyrants, who are politically the most reactionary.
在这类地区，既不要分土地，也不要分浮财，因为这些都是在新区和接敌区的条件之下，不利于联合或中立一切可能联合或中立的社会力量、完成消灭国民党反动力量这一基本任务的”。
Neither land nor movable property should be distributed in these areas, because they are newly liberated and border on enemy territory, and distribution there would not be of advantage to uniting with all social forces or persuading them to take a neutral stand for the accomplishment of the basic task of wiping out the Kuomintang reactionary forces”.
就是在那些已经分了土地的地方，因为问题很多，也应根据这个方针，从现有的实际情况出发，专门研究，订出办法，分别地实行调整。
Even in those areas where land has been redistributed, because of the many problems, we should, in accordance with this guideline and in light of the actual conditions, make a special study of the problems, work out solutions and make the necessary readjustment.
在执行中央这一方针的时候，可能遇到的最大障碍是某些干部的抵触，因此必须使干部从过去所犯“左”倾急性病的严重教训中来认识中央这一指示的全部正确性。
In carrying out the Central Committee's guideline, the major obstacle we may encounter is resistance by some cadres, so it is imperative that our cadres recognize the correctness of the Central Committee's directive by drawing severe lessons from the mistakes of their past “Left” impetuosity.
我们过去的重要教训是：
The important lessons for us are:
子、我们制订的方针和计划，不是从新区的客观实际出发，而是从主观的愿望出发。
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Our guidelines and plans were not formulated on the basis of reality in the new liberated areas, but out of our wishful thinking.
我们到新区不调查不研究，简单地抱着半年完成土改的意愿，不管敌情是否许可，不管群众的和干部的准备程度，忽视了群众工作的艰苦性，把少数勇敢分子的行动误认是大多数群众的行动，把大军进入后群众一时的热劲，误认是多数农民已经有了分配土地的觉悟和要求，因而不是有步骤有分别地去领导群众，取得胜利，而是轻率地决定实行土地改革。
When we arrived in the new liberated areas, we did not investigate and study the situation, but simply planned to complete land reform in six months, without regard to whether or not the enemy's situation permitted it and whether or not the masses and cadres were prepared for it.
We overlooked the arduousness of mass work, taking the action of a few reckless persons for that of the overwhelming majority of the masses, and the momentary popular enthusiasm upon the arrival of our army for the awakening of most peasants and their demands for the redistribution of land.
Therefore, we did not try to lead the masses in attaining victory step by step and group after group, but just decided recklessly to undertake land reform.
以大别山为例，有几十万人的地区分配了土地，国民党军结合地富势力很快组织起反攻，集中力量首先打击这些区域或其他工作较好的区域。
For instance, in the Dabie Mountains, land had been redistributed in areas with a total of several hundred thousand people, shortly before the Kuomintang troops collaborated with the forces of the landlords and rich peasants to launch counter-attacks, concentrating their forces on these areas or other areas where land reform had proceeded well.
而这些区域又都是一些突出的孤岛，也便利于敌人的打击，所以很快受到严重的摧残而全部塌台，工作最好的地方所受的摧残也最厉害。
Since these areas were like isolated islands standing out and vulnerable to the enemy's attacks, they were the first to suffer terrible and total destruction, with areas where work had been done most satisfactorily suffering the greatest losses.
或者是地富领导的假分；或者是群众一度得到而又在敌情严重和地富威胁下，秘密将土地归还地富，改成租佃关系；或者是少数勇敢分子（其中不少是流氓分子或与地主有联系的分子）霸占果实，而大多数贫雇农没有分到，或分得很坏很少的土地；或者是农民只敢要弱小地富和中农的土地，而不敢要有势力的地富的土地。
In some cases its redistribution was controlled by landlords and rich peasants.
In others, the masses who had obtained land returned it secretly to the landlords and rich peasants and then rented it from them when the enemy's activities presented a serious menace and the landlords and rich peasants made threats against them.
In still others, a handful of reckless persons (many of them riffraff or persons who had connections with landlords) seized the fruits of land reform, leaving the great majority of poor peasants and farm laborers with very little or poor land, if any at all.
In still other cases, the peasants were only brave enough to take the land of small, weak landlords and rich peasants and of middle peasants, avoiding the land of powerful landlords and rich peasants.
这种情况各地区都差不多，大都是由于当地群众并未真正发动起来和组织起来，大多数农民还没有分配土地的真实要求，而由外来干部用行政命令、包办代替的方法实行分配的结果。
These things happened nearly everywhere, mostly because cadres from other areas had land redistributed by administrative orders or redistributed it on behalf of the local people before the people were really aroused and organized and before the majority of peasants really wanted land redistribution.
经验证明，当我们在军事上还没有取得面的控制，国民党和地富武装力量还没有在当地被肃清，大多数农民还没有分配土地的要求和组织起来，本地的正派的区村干部还没有大批涌现出来，而外来干部又尚未熟悉情况和联系群众的时候，就马上实行土地改革，不仅是主观主义的，而且是冒险主义的。
Experience has proved that when we do not have an entire area under our control militarily, when the armed forces of Kuomintang and the landlords and rich peasants have not yet been eliminated, when the great majority of peasants are not demanding land redistribution and have not been organized, and when honest local cadres at the district and village levels have not emerged in large numbers and cadres sent in from other areas are not yet familiar with the local conditions and have not forged ties with the masses, an attempt to carry out land reform promptly is not only subjective, but adventurist.
丑、我们从领导机关到干部，一般地没有正确政策和策略的思想。
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Generally speaking, our leading bodies and cadres did not have the right idea about policies and tactics.
经过毛主席和中央历次指示之后，虽然比较好些，有些地区业已开始获得良好反映，但一般体会并不深刻，甚至还有抵触的。
After Chairman Mao and the Central Committee issued a series of directives in this regard, things are better and good results have been achieved in some areas.
However, most leading organs and cadres still lack a profound understanding of the directives and some are even against them.
由于我们反攻后对中原战局过于乐观，对新区地富力量仍然强大认识不足，以为枪杆加土地改革可以解决一切，所以在政策和策略上普遍犯了严重的“左”的错误。
Because we were overoptimistic about the situation concerning the war in the Central Plains after we embarked on the counter-offensive and because we underestimated the strength of landlords and rich peasants in the new liberated areas, believing we could solve every problem with guns plus land reform, we made severe “Left” errors in matters of policy and tactics on an extensive scale.
事实上，在新区存在着广泛的反蒋统一战线的力量。
Actually, in the new liberated areas there was a broad united-front force against Chiang Kai-shek.
在地富中，特别在知识分子中，并不是没有开明士绅和左翼分子，如安徽有反对国民党桂系的力量，河南有反对国民党汤恩伯的力量，我军刚到时，一般中小地主都没有跑等等。
Among landlords and rich peasants, especially among intellectuals, there were enlightened gentry and left-wingers.
For instance, there were forces opposed to the warlords of the Kuomintang Guangxi clique in Anhui, there were forces opposed to Tang Enbo, the Kuomintang general, in Henan, and when our army entered these areas, middle and small landlords stayed.
但是由于我们打倒一切和一次解决问题的“左”倾幼稚病的思想，忘记了毛主席“利用矛盾，争取多数，反对少数，各个击破”的策略原则指示，忘记了抗日时期的宝贵经验，或在过早实行土改上，或在筹粮筹款的负担政策（即打土豪的政策）上，或在工商政策（消灭地富的资本部分）上，或在打人、捉人、杀人问题上，把一批可能联合或中立的社会力量，迅速地赶到国民党方面去并且拿起武器来同我们对立。
However, suffering from a “Left” infantile disorder, we were bent on overthrowing everything and solving all the problems at one stroke, forgetting all about Chairman Mao's tactical principle-“make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one”-and the valuable experience acquired during the War of Resistance Against Japan.
Due to this, we have embarked on land reform prematurely and made mistakes in pursuing the policy concerning the distribution of burdens for raising grain and funds (namely, the policy of expropriating local tyrants) and the policy concerning industry and commerce (eliminating the capitalist sector of the landlord and rich peasant economy), and made the mistakes of beating people and making arrests and conducting execution indiscriminately, with the immediate result of driving to the Kuomintang side a number of social forces that took up arms against us; otherwise they might have joined us or been convinced not to oppose us.
其结果打击面大，树敌多，不是孤立了敌人，而是孤立了自己。
consequently, we broadened the scope of attack, making many enemies and isolating ourselves instead of the enemy.
寅、我们普遍实行了走马点火、分浮财的政策。
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We implemented a policy of arousing the masses to distribute movable property wherever we go.
事实上分得最多的只是一部分勇敢分子，大多数基本群众并未得到或很少得到利益。
In really, most of the property went to a few reckless individuals, while the great majority of the people received very little or nothing at all.