一 九月七日的电报 我们准备五年左右（从一九四六年七月算起）根本上打倒国民党，这是具有可能性的。
# §THE TELEGRAM OF SEPTEMBER 7#§We are prepared to bring about the fundamental overthrow of the Kuomintang in about five years, counting from July 1946. #This is possible.
只要我们每年歼灭国民党正规军一百个旅左右，五年歼敌五百个旅左右，就能达到此项目的。
# §Our objective can be attained provided we destroy about 100 brigades of Kuomintang regular troops every year, or some 500 brigades over the five years.
过去两年我军共歼敌正规军一百九十一个旅，平均每年九十五个半旅，每月八个旅弱。
#§ In the past two years our army has annihilated a total of 191 brigades of enemy regulars, an average of 95 brigades a year, or nearly 8 brigades a month.
今后三年要求我军歼敌正规军三百个旅以上。
# §In the next three years it is required that our army should wipe out 300 or more brigades of enemy regulars.
要求华东野战军担负歼灭四十个旅左右（他们七月歼灭的七个旅在内），并攻占济南和苏北、豫东、皖北若干大中小城市。
#§ The Eastern China Field Army is required to wipe out about 40 brigades (including the 7 already wiped out in July) and capture Tsinan and a number of large, medium and small cities in northern Kiangsu, eastern Honan and northern Anhwei.
要求中原野战军担负歼灭十四个旅左右（七月已歼两个旅在内），并攻占鄂豫皖三省若干城市。
# §The Central Plains Field Army is required to wipe out about 14 brigades (including the 1 1/2 brigades wiped out in July) and capture a number of cities in the provinces of Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei.
要求西北野战军担负歼灭十二个旅左右（八月已歼一个半旅在内）。
# §The Northwest Field Army is required to wipe out about 12 brigades (including the 1 brigades wiped out in August).
要求华北徐向前、周士第兵团歼灭阎锡山十四个旅左右（七月已歼八个旅在内），并攻占太原。
# §The army in northern China commanded by Hsu Hsiang-chien and Chou Shih-ti is required to wipe out about 14 brigades under Yen Hsi-shan (including the 8 brigades annihilated in July) and capture Taiyuan.
要求你们配合罗瑞卿、杨成武两兵团担负歼灭卫立煌、傅作义两军三十五个旅左右（七月杨成武已歼一个旅在内），并攻占北宁、平绥、平承、平保各线除北平、天津、沈阳三点以外的一切城市。
#§ You are required, in co-ordination with the 2 armies commanded by Lo Jui-ching and Yang Cheng-wu, to wipe out about 35 brigades of the 2 army groups under Wei Li-huang and Fu Tso-yi (including 1 brigade wiped out by Yang Cheng-wu in July) and capture all the cities along the Peiping-Liaoning, Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Chengteh and Peiping-Paoting Railways, except Peiping, Tientsin and Shenyang.
欲达此目的，战役部署指挥的适当，作战休息调节的适当，是决定性关键。
# §The decisive factors for the achievement of this objective are the proper disposition and command of troops in campaigns and a proper balance between fighting and rest.
你们如果能在九十两月或再多一点时间内歼灭锦州至唐山一线之敌，并攻克锦州、榆关、唐山诸点，就可以达到歼敌十八个旅左右之目的。
# §If in the two months of September and October, or a little longer, you can wipe out the enemy along the line from Chinchow to Tangshan and take Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan, you will have achieved the task of wiping out some 18 enemy brigades.
为了歼灭这些敌人，你们现在就应该准备使用主力于该线，而置长春、沈阳两敌于不顾，并准备在打锦州时歼灭可能由长、沈援锦之敌。
# §In order to wipe them out, you must now prepare to employ your main force on this line, leaving the enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang alone. #§ When you are attacking Chinchow, be prepared also to wipe out the enemy forces that may come to its rescue from Changchun and Shenyang.
因为锦、榆、唐三点及其附近之敌互相孤立，攻歼取胜比较确实可靠，攻锦打援亦较有希望。
#§ Because the enemy forces In and near Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan are isolated from each other, success in attacking and wiping them out is pretty certain, and there is also a fair hope of success in capturing Chinchow and in attacking enemy reinforcements.
如果你们以主力位于新民及其以北地区准备打长、沈出来之敌，则该敌因受你们威胁太大，可能不敢出来。
# §If, however, you were to dispose your main force at Hsinmin and its northern environs in preparation for attacking the enemy forces which might come out from Changchun and Shenyang, then the enemy might not dare come out at all because you would be too great a menace.
一方面长、沈之敌可能不出来，另一方面锦、榆、唐诸点及其附近之敌（十八个旅）则因你们去的兵力过小，可能收缩于锦、唐两点，变为不甚好打而又不得不打，费时费力，这样就有可能使自己陷入被动地位。
#§ On the one hand, the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang might not come out. #§ And, on the other hand, because the forces you dispatch towards Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan would be too small, the enemy in and near these three cities (comprising 18 brigades) would probably fall back on Chinchow and Tangshan, and you would find it rather difficult and yet necessary to attack them, wasting time and energy and thus perhaps landing yourselves in a passive position.
不如置长、沈两敌于不顾，专顾锦、榆、唐一头为适宜。
#§ For these reasons, it will be better to leave the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang alone and focus your attention on the enemy at Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan.
再则，今年九月至明年六月的十个月内，你们要准备进行三次大战役，每次准备费去两个月左右时间，共费去六个月左右时间，余四个月作为休息时间。
#§ Another point: you must prepare to fight three big campaigns in the ten months from September to next June and to spend about two months on each campaign, making a total of about six months and leaving four months for rest.
如果在你们进行锦、榆、唐战役（第一个大战役）期间，长、沈之敌倾巢援锦（因为你们主力不是位于新民而是位于锦州附近，卫立煌才敢于来援），则你们便可以不离开锦、榆、唐线连续大举歼灭援敌，争取将卫立煌全军就地歼灭。
#§ During the Chinchow-Shanhaiknan-Tangshan campaign (the first big campaign), if the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang sallies forth in full strength to rescue Chinchow (because your main force will be disposed not at Hsinmin but around Chinchow, Wei Li-huang will be emboldened to come to the rescue), then, without leaving the Chinchow-Shanhaikuan-Tangshan line, you can follow up immediately with large-scale annihilating attacks on the enemy reinforcements and strive to wipe out all Wei Li-huang's troops on the spot.
这是最理想的情况。
# § This would be the ideal situation.
于此，你们应当注意：（一）确立攻占锦、榆、唐三点并全部控制该线的决心。
#§ Hence, you should pay attention to the following: #§(1) Be firmly determined to attack and capture Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan and to take control of the entire line.
（二）确立打你们前所未有的大歼灭战的决心，即在卫立煌全军来援的时候敢于同他作战。
#§(2) Be firmly determined to fight a battle of annihilation on a scale larger than you have ever fought before, that is, dare to fight all Wei Li-huang's army when it comes to the rescue.
（三）为适应上述两项决心，重新考虑作战计划并筹办全军军需（粮食、弹药、新兵等）和处理俘虏事宜。
#§(3) In keeping with these two resolves, reconsider your plan of operations, make arrangements to meet the military requirements of your whole force (food, ammunition, recruits, and so on) and to handle captives.
以上意见望考虑电复。
#§Please consider the above and telegraph your reply.
二 十月十日的电报 （一）从你们开始攻击锦州之日起，一个时期内是你们战局紧张期间，望你们每两日或每三日以敌情（锦州守敌之抵抗能力，葫芦岛、锦西援敌和沈阳援敌之进度，长春敌军之动态）我情（攻城进度，攻城和阻援之伤亡程度）电告我们一次。
#§II.
THE TELEGRAM OF OCTOBER 10#§1.
From the day you start attacking Chinchow, there will be a period when the tactical situation will be very tense. #§ We hope that you will inform us by radio every two or three days of the enemy's situation (the strength of the resistance by his forces defending Chinchow, the progress of his reinforcements from Hulutao and Chinhsi and from Shenyang and the probable course of action of his troops in Changchun) and of our own situation (the progress of our attack on the city and the casualties sustained in attacking the city and holding off enemy reinforcements).