事实上，国际法学会从其最初就驱逐外国人问题进行研究时就已经指出，行使驱逐权受若干条件制约，其中包括“驱逐时必须作出人道和尊重公认权利所需的一切安排”。
In fact, from the time of its first work on the expulsion of aliens, the Institute of International Law has stated that the exercise of the right of expulsion is subject to certain restrictions, including the principle that “expulsion must be carried out with full consideration, in accordance with the requirements of humanity and respect for acquired rights”.
研究所在这一点上与Féraud-Giraud先生的意见一致，后者在其关于这个专题的学术论文中认为，国家在行使驱逐权时必须始终尽可能地努力做到一方面确保境内秩序及保证本国内部和外部安全，另一方面“尊重人道法则、任何个人的固有权利及国家之间关系自由的原则”。
On this point, it shared the views of Féraud-Giraud who, in his paper on the subject, stated that, in exercising its right of expulsion, a State must always, as far as possible, try to reconcile its duty to maintain order in its territory and to safeguard its own internal and external security with the need “to respect the laws of humanity, the human rights of every individual and the principle of freedom of relations between nations”.
本着同一精神，学会关于这个专题的报告员De Bar先生在承认国家在这个领域的主权权利不容争议的同时也写道，“这一主权权利不论如何解释，也不能解释为消灭外国人的任何个人权利”。
In the same vein, the Institute's rapporteur on the subject, von Bar, while recognizing that the sovereign right of States was unquestionable in that regard, nonetheless expressed the view, “no matter how far this sovereign right extends, it may not extend to abolishing all the individual rights of aliens”.
17. 确认驱逐权是一项绝对和可酌处的权利所产生的风险是显而易见的，但法律上并没有对此作出清晰的回应。
The danger of affirming that the right of expulsion was absolute and discretionary was well understood, but the legal response was not well articulated.
这一风险不仅仅在于损害个人权利，但法理和判例都让人以为，驱逐权只受人道因素和个人及其财产权利的限制。
Although the area of human rights is not the only one affected, both the literature and case law suggest that the right of expulsion is limited only by considerations of humanity and is therefore limited to the rights of the individual and his or her property rights.
诚然，国际法学会在1891年引述“任何个人的固有权利及国家之间关系自由的原则”（见上段）时似乎已经开了个头，但何去何从？
It is true that, by invoking the human rights of every individual and the principle of freedom of relations between nations (see preceding paragraph), the Institute of International Law seemed, in 1891, to be hinting at something new — but what?
过去的法理是不精确的。
The early literature is not precise.
虽然它的确摒弃了中世纪采纳的认为国家既然拥有领土所有权也就拥有绝对主权的理论，但它用于反驳的，却是“由此可避免外国人的权利任由国家摆布” 这个过于模糊的观点。
Admittedly, it sets aside the theory adopted in the Middle Ages according to which State sovereignty was absolute and ownership of the territory was attributed to the State.
However, in place of that theory, it proposes the rather vague idea that “it does not follow that the rights of aliens are at the mercy of the State's whim”.
18. 为了确定驱逐权力或驱逐能力规则的范围，似宜先设法回答在哪些界限内思考驱逐权的问题。
In order to determine the scope of the rule establishing the power or authority to expel, the following question should be asked: what limits should be imposed on the right of expulsion?
对这个中心问题的回答分为两个不同方面。
The answer to this key question has two distinct components.
第一个方面涉及国际法律秩序的本质，这一本质要求国际法的任何规则或任何原则都与国际法律秩序的基本原则保持一致，这是法律秩序本身的内在或固有的限制。
The first is linked to the very nature of the international legal order, which requires that every rule or principle of international law be compatible with the underlying tenets of that legal order; these are constraints that are intrinsic to or inherent in the legal order itself.
第二个方面涉及行使驱逐权时须遵守的原则，这些原则包括一整套主要由法律秩序以一般和客观规则的形式或以国际法主体所创规则的形式产生的派生规则。
The second component relates to the principles which must be respected when the right of expulsion is exercised; they constitute a set of rules derived from, or essentially produced by, the legal order in the form of objective and general rules or in the form of rules created by the subjects of international law.
这第二类限制将在本节B部分中单独论述。
This second category of limits will be dealt with separately under subheading B of this section.
(b) 国际法律秩序的内在限制
(b) Limits inherent in the international legal order
19. 国际法作为对“同样有意行使绝对主权”的主权实体平等适用的法律，是这些主权实体得以共存的不可或缺的调节机制，同时又是必然结果。
Since international law applies to equal, sovereign entities “with the same claims to the exercise of absolute sovereignty”, it constitutes a vital means of regulating the coexistence of these sovereign entities while also being the necessary corollary thereof.
事实上，国家主权在现代国际法中已经不能用绝对意义来解释。
In fact, in modern international law, State sovereignty cannot be understood in the absolute sense; it means only that no State is subordinate to any other State, but that each must respect the minimum rules that guarantee, on the one hand, the same privileges to all other States and, on the other hand, the very survival of the legal order.
国家主权仅仅意味着，该国不隶属于任何其他国家，但须遵守最起码的规则，一方面保证所有其他国家的同等特权，另一方面保证法律秩序本身得以延续。
In fact, in modern international law, State sovereignty cannot be understood in the absolute sense; it means only that no State is subordinate to any other State, but that each must respect the minimum rules that guarantee, on the one hand, the same privileges to all other States and, on the other hand, the very survival of the legal order.
在这方面，国家主权受这一法律秩序中若干内在原则的制约，如果不予以遵守，国际法本身的存在就将受到损害，而国际社会也必定会陷入完全无序的状态。
In this regard, State sovereignty is limited by a number of underlying tenets that are inherent in the legal order and without respect for which the very existence of international law would be compromised and the international community doomed to total anarchy.
20. 驱逐的酌处权受国际秩序中制约国家行动的一般原则的限制。
The discretionary power of expulsion is limited by the general principles governing State actions in the international order.
事实上，作为国家主权的固有权利，驱逐权自然要面对构成国际法律体系基石的一整套基本原则的制约和限制。
In fact, as a right inherent in State sovereignty, the right of expulsion is naturally subject to these limits, a set of underlying tenets that form the basis of the international legal system.
这些限制独立存在于国际人权法、国际难民法、移徙工人法等国际法专门领域的其他限制性原则之外。
These limits exist independently of other constraints relating to special areas of international law such as international human rights law, international refugee law and the law on migrant workers.
同驱逐权是主权所固有一样，这些限制也是国际法律秩序所固有。
They are inherent in the international legal order in the same way as the right of expulsion is inherent in sovereignty.
因此，驱逐的主权权利并非绝对权利，其有效性取决于惯例、条约或一般法律原则所产生的国家义务。
Since the sovereign right of expulsion is not, therefore, an absolute right, its validity is determined in the light of the State's obligations, whether they derive from custom, treaty, or general principles of law.
如此前所述，一般情况下，“酌处”一词在形容国家驱逐权的同时意味着这一权力并非“任意”，因此，国家不能滥用在这方面公认的酌处权。
As has been noted, the term “discretionary”, which qualifies the power of the State with regard to expulsion, is generally coupled with the idea that such a power is not “arbitrary” and, consequently, that the State should not abuse the discretion accorded to it in such matters.